The intent of this paper is to explore the implications of the United States relinquishing its monopoly on the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The paper analyzes and assesses the implications of this proposition within the context of meeting the objectives stated in the November 2010 version of the NATO Strategic Concept. Accepting the premise that United States participation and leadership in strengthening our current alliances and international organizations is essential to American national security, it is likely albeit counterintuitive that a relinquishment of the SACEUR position would facilitate greater cohesiveness and effectiveness in NATO. Further, the paper attempts to prove that despite relinquishing the monopoly on the SACEUR billet neither the world position, stature, nor power of the United States would diminish in any tangible manner.
Acknowledging that NATO stands at a the crossroads of significant importance and potential irrelevance, a bold move by the United States may very well be the catalyst for strengthening the alliance to meet the demands of the future while achieving its own national objectives stated in the American National Security Strategy and the NATO Strategic Concept.
NON-AMERICAN SACEUR: WIN-WIN FOR NATO AND THE UNITED STATES
Only control over the unbridled exercise of American power could bring a measure of serenity to these unsettled relationships. Rather than seek to maximize its autonomy in the short run, the United States could willingly bind itself, sacrificing short-run gains for the creation of an international milieu from which it would in the long run profit, perhaps disproportionately. 4 In the words of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, -NATO has adopted an action plan which sets out concrete steps it will take in order to put in place a renewed Euro-Atlantic Alliance, ready to meet the threats of the 21 st Century.‖
The threats that the NATO Strategic Concept envisions cross a broad spectrum of possibilities. Beyond the collective defense commitments in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO has embraced an active approach to enhancement of international security beyond the borders of the member states. 6 Dramatic changes in the strategic landscape have not changed the fundamental promise of the treaty; rather the changes have required an acknowledgement that new threats demand a response from NATO and within an Alliance context. 7 Therefore, it appears that future commitments, like that of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan, will be more the norm than an anomaly. Despite the political difficulties inherent in -out of sector‖ missions, NATO has now linked Alliance member security with terrorism and other threats beyond the borders of Europe and North America. 8 Broadening the view and scope of NATO engagement beyond the territorial confines of the member nations requires the -concrete steps‖ alluded to by Secretary General
Rasmussen.
The Secretary General pledged at Lisbon that NATO would -slim down, speed up, and become more flexible‖ 9 to meet the challenges of the future. Much of the promised reform centered on increasing efficiencies in the NATO command structure, consolidation of various NATO agencies and the headquarters itself. 10 Although an admirable attempt, it is unlikely that reducing redundancy in various military and political organs of the Alliance will substantially improve its efficiency. Despite the internal tension within the European block of NATO, another obstacle to continuity within the Alliance is the gap between NATO and the EU. The
Union has become a powerful instrument for harnessing European potential within NATO. Whatever the national interests or desires that cause conflict between European members of NATO and EU, the decision to act in a given situation is made through the EU. 21 Since 21 of NATO's 28 members are also conjoined with the EU, it is essential that a close and meaningful relationship be maintained between the two organizations.
As specified in the NATO Strategic Concept, -NATO and the EU can and should play complimentary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security.‖ 22 As previously mentioned, this may be easier said than done considering the self-consciously different and sometimes even hostile to that of America. 33 In the United
States, domestic opinion has also been shaped by these political differences, leading many to question the value of the Alliance. 34 This divergence is detrimental to the longterm effectiveness of NATO. Accepting the value of a strong and united NATO, it is incumbent on the United States to evaluate the causes of conflict within the Alliance and make changes to address the issues. Combating anti-Americanism within the Alliance is a critical first step to building solidarity among the member states. At the root of anti-American feeling in Europe is the notion of ‗American exceptionalism -in essence, the idea that the United States does not have to play by the same rules as everyone else. 35 Countering this perception in Europe requires the United States to foster a sense of reciprocal multilateralism and a concerted effort to treat her European allies as co-equal partners. 36 The American assumption that it must lead wherever it is involved is problematic in the minds of many
Europeans and contributes to a sense of inequality. Supporting the installation of a European SACEUR demonstrates a self-constraint by the United States that institutionalizes an apparently deliberative process and perceptively levels the playing field within the NATO military structure. 37 Such an action will go a long way toward fostering a perception of partnership and equity of opinion, which is essential to promoting a more positive impression of the United States through multilateral reciprocity.
An increased sense of multilateral reciprocity, as embodied by a European SACEUR, will also help to narrow the divide between the EU and NATO. The current ‗two pillar' (the United States and EU) approach to aligning security strategy in Europe has frequently led to a ‗coherence deficit' stemming from European policy development through the EU and the United States injecting its views as NATO policy. 38 In essence, the twenty-one members of the EU and NATO get one vote through the good offices of the EU while the United States maintains a -super vote‖ as the voice of NATO. To many European states, specifically the French, this remains a major obstacle to aligning ESDP and NATO policy. The desire by France and other European nations is to bring the EU and NATO policy together through a sense of ‗necessary partnership' rather than ‗traditional allies' is hindered by America's dominant role in NATO's operational command structure. 39 A SACEUR who's nation speaks with one voice in both NATO and the EU is likely to open the door toward a more unified security policy between the two partner organizations.
A European SACEUR also opens the door toward improved relations with 53 United States-European cooperation is vital to managing peace and through coordination and consensual agreement remains ready to respond to crisis. 54 A mutual, co-equal relationship within the Alliance and its military command structure is an important step forward in strengthening this most important of Alliances.
Conclusion
Without question, strengthening NATO is in the best interest of the United States, Europe and likely the entire world community. Now that the member nations of the world's most successful and enduring political-military alliance have recommitted themselves to defend their universal and perpetual values through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve 55 , it is time that tangible steps are taken to meet these objectives.
A number of obstacles remain on the path to achieving the goals set forth at Lisbon in November 2010. Many of these impediments stem from negative perceptions of the United States and past policies of previous administrations. The Obama Administration has publicly voiced a desire to break from the past and take proactive actions to forge partnerships with our closest friends.
The United States has a unique ability and responsibility to take necessary action to facilitate stronger partnerships. By taking action that is perceived to self-limit its own End Notes.
